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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ROSENN, Circuit Judge. 
 
This appeal presents an issue of first impression in this 
circuit pertaining to a lawyer's right to make extrajudicial 
statements to the press relating to a former client's pending 
criminal case. The exchange between the defendant's 
former lawyer and a member of the press resulted in a 
newspaper article that raised the District Court's 
indignation. The Court imposed a gag order against Donald 
F. Manno, defendant's former counsel; Manno appealed. 
The primary issue on appeal concerns the First Amendment 
right of speech. Before reaching that issue, we must 
consider certain procedural matters concerning the 
appealability of an oral order, the effect on the record of the 
District Court's addition to it after a notice of appeal is 
filed, and the collateral order doctrine. Because we hold 
that we have jurisdiction over an appealable collateral oral 
order, and that it was error to issue the gag order, it will be 
reversed. 
 
I. 
 
A. 
 
On June 21, 2000, a federal Grand Jury in the District 
of New Jersey issued a sealed indictment charging 
Nicodemo Scarfo ("Scarfo") and Frank Paolercio with 
various illegal gambling acts. Donald F. Manno, Esq. 
("Manno") made an initial appearance for Scarfo. For 
reasons not relevant to our decision, the United States 
moved to disqualify Manno, and the District Court granted 
the motion. 
 
Subsequently, the Philadelphia Inquirer ("Inquirer") 
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interviewed Manno. On December 4, 2000, over a month 
after the court disqualified Manno from the Scarfo 
proceedings, an article appeared in the Inquirer quoting 
Manno and the government prosecutor. The article 
concerned a controversial means of surveillance used to 
acquire evidence against Scarfo.1 Both Manno and the 
prosecutor predicted the filing of a pretrial motion 
contesting the legality of the Government's surveillance 
technique.2 
 
On December 5, 2000, the District Court held a 
previously scheduled hearing. Citing the Inquirer article, 
the Court entered an oral order barring "anybody from 
talking to the press about the motion that I haven't seen 
and that I don't know anything about." The Court stated 
that the order applied to Manno, although he no longer 
represented Scarfo. The order was to last until the Court 
received the motion and decided it. Manno requested a 
written order, and the Court promised one. The docket 
entry for the December 5, 2000, hearing states, inter alia, 
"ORDERED THAT A GAG ORDER REMAIN IN EFFECT." On 
December 8, 2000 Manno filed a notice of appeal. 
 
On January 10, 2001, the District Court held another 
hearing. Manno appeared, along with his replacement, 
Vincent Scoca, Esq., and the government counsel. Manno 
and the District Court engaged in a lengthy discussion after 
which the District Court orally clarified and affirmed its 
December 5 oral order. The District Court again promised 
a written order. 
 
On February 9, 2001, Manno filed his brief on appeal 
with this Court. On March 12, 2001, more than two 
months after the hearing, the District Court signed an 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The Government suspected that Scarfo used a certain computer to 
facilitate his illegal gambling activities. After securing a search 
warrant, 
the Government installed a difficult-to-detect hardware device on 
Scarfo's computer. The device purportedly allowed the FBI to reproduce 
every stroke entered on Scarfo's computer, and later to use that 
information to read the contents of the computer files. 
 
2. We learned at oral argument that Scarfo's new counsel filed a motion 
on this issue earlier this year. The Government has responded, and the 
parties anticipate adjudication sometime in August or September, 2001. 
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order formalizing its December 5, 2000, and January 10, 
2001, oral orders, and making findings of fact. On May 14, 
2001, Manno filed a reply brief in response to the 
Government's brief, discussing, in part, the District Court's 
written order. 
 
B. 
 
1. The Inquirer Article 
 
On December 4, 2000, a Philadelphia Inquirer article 
reported the Government's use of a "keystroke-logging 
device" on Scarfo's computer. The article stated that the 
device "allowed the FBI to reproduce every stroke[Scarfo] 
entered on a computer on which gambling records allegedly 
were stored." The article predicted that Scarfo's legal 
challenge of the keystroke-logging device "may create new 
law." 
 
The article also quoted Manno as stating that "[a]nything 
[Scarfo] typed on that keyboard -- a letter to his lawyer, 
personal or medical records, legitimate business records -- 
they got it all. . . . That's scary. It's dangerous." The article 
continued: 
 
       Manno contends that federal investigators improperly 
       used a search warrant as authorization to install a 
       keystroke recorder on Scarfo's business computer in 
       the spring of 1999. By monitoring the keyboard during 
       May and June, investigators were able to determine the 
       code and password Scarfo used to access an encrypted 
       program which, authorities suspected, he was storing 
       gambling and loan-sharking records. 
 
       Manno said that he was preparing a motion 
       challenging the legality of the surveillance when he was 
       disqualified from the case in October. Manno was 
       barred because in the past he represented a client who 
       expected to testify for the government against Scarfo. 
 
       He said he expected the challenge to the surveillance 
       will be raise by whomever Scarfo hires to replace him. 
 
       "I don't think there is any case law on this issue, and 
       I hope the fact that it's a so-called organized crime 
 
                                4 
  
       investigation doesn't detract from the fundamental and 
       overriding concern here, which is an individual's right 
       to privacy," Manno said last week. 
 
The article concluded: 
 
       Manno would not discuss what his client was storing 
       on the [computer] but said Scarfo was using software 
       known as PGP. "It stands for Pretty Good Privacy," the 
       lawyer said with a chuckle. 
 
The article also quoted the prosecuting attorney: 
 
       "I can't talk about any of it," he said, "but I think it's 
       correct to say this is [a] cutting-edge [legal issue]." 
 
2. December 5, 2000 Hearing 
 
On December 5, 2000, the District Court held a hearing 
originally scheduled to ensure that Scarfo found a 
replacement lawyer after Manno's October 27, 2000, 
disqualification. The hearing quickly re-focused on the 
Judge's reaction to reading the December 4, 2000, Inquirer 
article. The Judge stated, "I'm barring anybody from talking 
to the press about the motion that I haven't seen and that 
I don't know anything about." He continued, "Mr. Manno, 
you are under a specific obligation and injunction from this 
Court not to speak to the press about this case at all. 
Period. And if you have an objection to my motion, you 
have a right to go to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. If 
you want to do it, be my guest." 
 
The Judge, apparently perturbed at not having seen or 
decided any motion papers before their substance appeared 
in the press, proceeded to flesh out the order. He stated: 
 
       The Court: No matter who you talk to, you tell them 
       they're not to talk to the press about this case. Appx. 
       13. 
 
       The Court: After I decide whatever is going to be 
       decided -- I don't know what it is -- the, of course, 
       that is a different rule. Right now, we're not going to 
       try this case in the Philadelphia Inquirer or the Atlantic 
       City Journal or the Newark Star-Ledger or any other 
       newspaper. Id. 
 
                                5 
  
       Manno: Judge, I assume that your Honor will be so 
       kind as to put into writing the injunction against me? 
 
       The Court: If you would like it. 
 
       Manno: I would appreciate if you would put that into 
       writing. 
 
       The Court: It will be my pleasure. Id. at 17. 
 
       The Court: You're a citizen, but you're subject to this 
       Court. You know, you can't make comments about a 
       case that is pending in front of me at this point. .. . I 
       don't want people to tell me I got a cutting-edge 
       cyberspace, whatever, when I haven't seen a piece of 
       paper that reflects anything about this case. When I 
       get the motion and I decide the motion, if you want to 
       speak, you're a citizen, you're entitled to speak. You're 
       entitled to say the judge is wrong, right, praise me or 
       damn me. Doesn't matter. Id. at 18. 
 
       The Court: I might be influenced by [an argument in 
       the newspaper] if it was a good argument . . . . What 
       I object to, so that you know, is extrajudicial comments 
       about a matter which is not even pending before this 
       Court yet. Id. at 19. 
 
       The Court: I'm not suggesting people can't look at the 
       public records. They're entitled to [that]. I'm not sealing 
       the record in this case. I'm merely saying until this 
       Court has had an opportunity to see the motions, to 
       see the response by the government and to hear oral 
       argument, I don't want it commented upon. That's all. 
 
       Manno: I understand your order. Id. at 20-21. 
 
3. January 10, 2001 Hearing 
 
After the December 10 hearing, the Government proposed 
a written order embodying the Court's oral order. The 
District Court rejected the order as inaccurate. See Supp. 
Appx. 32. On January 10, 2001, the District Court held a 
hearing concerning Scarfo's retention of new counsel and, 
again, the Court spent much of the hearing discussing the 
injunction with Manno: 
 
       The Court: It was brought to my attention that there 
       was an article in the Philadelphia paper . . . in which 
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       you gave an interview . . . in which you talked about 
       the cyber space, or something, and this was ground- 
       breaking material dealing with the government's 
       intrusion upon defendant's rights, et cetera. . . . I was 
       unaware of that issue, number one; and number two, 
       had not ruled upon that issue, and had not heard 
       argument upon that issue, and had not read one shred 
       of piece of paper on that. . . . 
 
        I was upset because, in my judgment, you were 
       trying that motion in front of the press before you gave 
       this Court an opportunity even to see the matter and 
       to me that is what I restrained. Id. at 34. 
 
       The Court: I did not put a gag order on the case . .. 
       I was going to stop [discussions in the press] until I 
       heard the motion. Id. at 34. 
 
       The Court: I haven't modified [the oral order of 
       12/6/00] one iota. If I don't have the right to at least 
       retain some decorum in the presentation of matters 
       during the course of the criminal case, without 
       impinging upon the First Amendment rights of the 
       people, . . . let the Third Circuit Court of Appeals tell 
       you that. I think I have an inherent right to control 
       proceedings before me. . . . I felt that your actions in 
       speaking to the press was totally inappropriate . . . . Id. 
       at 37. 
 
       The Court: When you come up in my land, we do 
       things orderly, we do things nicely, and civilly, and we 
       don't try cases in the press. Id. 
 
       Manno: [I]t is beyond anything I could imagine that 
       that article in the Philadelphia newspaper affected the 
       decorum or the dignity in this court and certainly none 
       of my comments were meant in any way, shape, or 
       form . . . to compromise the integrity and dignity of 
       this Court. Id. at 37-38. 
 
       The Court: I'm not talking about affecting the jury.. . . 
       You folks are off in left field when you talk about 
       [affecting the jury]. I was concerned whether we talk 
       about how I felt -- orderly presentation of significant 
       and important arguments by counsel. . . And if you 
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       want to say you're affecting someone, or trying to affect 
       someone, you're trying to affect the judiciary. . . . I 
       don't want to read about something that hasn't even 
       occurred in my court to be placed in a newspaper by 
       one of the counsel who was then counsel for -- who 
       was then counsel for the defendant in the case. Id. at 
       38-39. 
 
       Manno: I cannot see how a newspaper article in the 
       Philadelphia Inquirer can affect this Court, that this 
       Court could not effectively disregard this article .. . . 
 
       The Court: Your knowledge of this [case] did not come 
       to you because you were an ordinary citizen on the 
       street. The Philadelphia Inquirer did not come to you 
       because they wanted to get an expert opinion. They 
       came to you because you were Mr. Scarfo's lawyer and 
       they thought you were Mr. Scarfo's lawyer until you 
       said I had disqualified you. Your knowledge does not 
       emanate from a source outside of this proceeding, it 
       comes specifically because of this proceeding. . . . Id. at 
       41. 
 
       Manno: Quite frankly, Judge, what relevance does it 
       have, the source of my information? 
 
       The Court: It has a lot of relevance. You're trying to 
       pretend to be a common person. In fact, your 
       knowledge comes specifically from your involvement in 
       this case . . . . Don't clothe yourself with the white 
       cloak of being someone in the street who is interviewed 
       by the Philadelphia Inquirer. . . . You got to argue 
       [Scarfo's future motion] in the press. Id.  at 42. 
 
4. March 12, 2001 Written Order 
 
During the January 10 hearing, the Court offered Manno 
an opportunity to submit a form of order, but Manno 
refused. Instead, the Government proposed an order, which 
the Court signed and entered on March 12, 2001. 3 It stated 
that the matter came before the Court sua sponte, and was 
based "on the record made during the proceeding in this 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. By this time, Manno had already submitted his appellate brief to this 
Court. 
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matter on December 5, 2000, and January 10, 2001." The 
order proceeded to find, in relevant part, that: 1) Manno 
had discussed the merits of an anticipated motion in the 
case concerning electronic or computer surveillance 
techniques; 2) without a court order, Manno would likely 
make such statements to the press in the future, and those 
statements would be "received as authoritative" given his 
previous representation of Scarfo; 3) a local Criminal Rule 
prohibits a lawyer representing a party in a criminal matter 
from making an extrajudicial statement if the lawyer knows 
or should reasonably know that it will have a substantial 
likelihood of causing material prejudice to an adjudicative 
proceeding; 4) there is a substantial likelihood of future 
statements, and future statements to the press regarding 
legal issues prior to adjudication will "materially prejudice 
the Court's ability to fairly and efficiently determine the 
anticipated pre-trial motion and any legal issues not yet 
presented to and adjudicated by the Court"; 5) other 
curative measures concerning empaneling an impartial jury 
would likely be ineffective in ensuring that such statements 
would not risk harm to the judicial process; 6) this order is 
the least restrictive means available to prevent the 
threatened danger; and 7) the order lasts no longer than 
necessary to prevent the threatened danger, and is 
narrowly drawn to prohibit only those statements having a 
meaningful likelihood of materially impairing the Court's 
ability to fairly and efficiently determine the anticipated 
pre-trial motion "and any legal issues not yet presented to 
and adjudicated by the Court, and to conduct a fair trial." 
 
The Court ordered that: 
 
       [N]o lawyer representing or who has represented a 
       party in this criminal matter could make any 
       extrajudicial statement to the press regarding legal 
       issues which may be raised concerning electronic or 
       computer surveillance techniques, which a reasonable 
       person would expect to be disseminated by means of 
       public communication, which he knows or reasonably 
       should know will have a substantial likelihood of 
       causing material prejudice to the determination of the 
       anticipated or filed pre-trial motion, or the conducting 
       of a fair trial in the case. 
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The order was to remain in effect until "any such motion 
raising these legal issues is adjudicated by the court." 
 
II. 
 
In light of the oral order, we first must determine whether 
we have jurisdiction over the appeal, and if so, what 
constitutes the record. We engage in this threshold inquiry 
sua sponte, as the parties did not brief any of the 
jurisdictional issues. At oral argument, counsel for both 
sides argued in favor of our exercising jurisdiction, but a 
more searching inquiry is necessary because consent does 
not confer appellate jurisdiction.4 
 
A. 
 
The District Court expressed doubt about whether its 
December 6, 2000, oral order was appealable. See  Supp. 
Appx. 31 ("first of all, I don't think the notice of appeal is 
effective; there's no written order.") A district court's order 
"is ordinarily considered final and appealable under S 1291 
only if it `ends the litigation on the merits and leaves 
nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.' " 
Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706 (1996) 
(quoting Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945)). 
Under the collateral order doctrine, however, an otherwise 
non-final order can be appealed if it finally and conclusively 
determines the disputed question, resolves an important 
issue separate from the underlying merits, and is effectively 
unreviewable after final judgment. See In re Tutu Wells 
Contam. Litig., 120 F.3d 368, 378 (3d Cir. 1997) (citing 
Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 
(1949)). 
 
In this case, the District Court finally and conclusively 
entered a gag order against Manno. The gag order was 
separate from the underlying merits of Scarfo's guilt or 
innocence. The order concerned Manno's First Amendment 
rights, not Scarfo's or anyone else's Constitutional rights. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. There being no "unyielding jurisdictional hierarchy," Ruhrgas AG v. 
Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 577 (1999), we approach these 
preliminary and jurisdictional inquiries in no particular order. 
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See United States v. Brown, 218 F.3d 415, 422 (5th Cir. 
2000) (defendant state official's appeal of gag order was 
collateral to the criminal action pending against him). 
Although we could review a gag order after entry of a final 
judgment, doing so could be at considerable expense of the 
silenced party's constitutional rights. Moreover, in this 
instance, the party is no longer Scarfo's attorney in the 
underlying criminal proceedings. Hence, the collateral order 
doctrine confers appellate jurisdiction over Manno's appeal. 
 
B. 
 
Manno filed his notice of appeal on December 8, 2000. 
The Government argues that the notice of appeal was filed 
prematurely under Fed. R. App. Proc. 4(a)(2), and 
additionally because the District Court stated on December 
6 that a written order would issue. The oral order 
possessed judicial force and effect;5 it had teeth and had 
Manno violated it, he might have been subject to 
punishment even if the order had not yet been reduced to 
writing. That order's oral status does not alter its 
appealability as a collateral order. Manno did not file his 
notice of appeal prematurely; the notice of appeal was filed 
timely and it effected a closure of the District Court's 
jurisdiction over the gag order issue. See Sheet Metal 
Workers' Int'l Assn. Local 19M v. Herre Bros., Inc. , 198 F.3d 
391, 393 (3d Cir. 1999) ("The filing of a notice of appeal 
confers jurisdiction on the Court of Appeals and divests the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. In United States v. Schiavo, 504 F.2d 1, 4-5 (1974), the District Court 
entered an oral order preventing the press from reporting on a trial. We 
found it unnecessary to resolve whether the oral order was an 
appealable order because the District Court eventually issued a written 
order upon which we decided the appeal. We noted, however, that 
"[w]here a district court enters . . . an order which is immediately 
appealable as a final decision in a collateral matter, and where such 
order binds non-parties for a continuing period of time, the order should 
be reduced to written form, stating specifically the terms of the order 
and 
the reasons therefor, and entered on the district court docket." Id. at 7. 
We add that the reduction to written form should be done with 
reasonable promptness. 
 
We also read Schiavo as implying that an oral order enjoining conduct 
in a collateral matter may be appealable. 
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district court of its control over those aspects of the case 
involved in the appeal.") (citations omitted). 6 
 
Fed. R. App. Proc. 4(a)(2) states that "[a] notice of appeal 
filed after the court announces a decision or order-- but 
before the entry of the judgment or order -- is treated as 
filed on the date of and after the entry." Rule 4(a)(2) does 
not apply here because this rule concerns primarily 
whether a notice of appeal was filed in or out of time. See, 
e.g., Firstier Mortg. Co. v. Investors Mortg. Ins. Co., 498 U.S. 
269 (1991); Lazy Oil Co. v. Witco Corp., 166 F.3d 581 (3d 
Cir. 1999); Hindes v. F.D.I.C., 137 F.3d 148 (3d Cir. 1998); 
Reo v. United States Postal Svc., 98 F.3d 73 (3d Cir. 1996). 
In this case, the timeliness of the appeal is not at issue. 
Unlike a judgment,7 if all other jurisdictional requirements 
are met, the order's existence in oral form will not by itself 
prevent it from being appealable. The District Court should 
have moved promptly in reducing its order to writing. See 
Schiavo, 504 F.2d at 4-5. 
 
C. 
 
The parties dispute the contents of the record on review. 
Manno argues that the record was closed after December 5, 
2000, though he conceded at oral argument that he 
thought the March 12, 2001, written order should be 
reversed. The Government argues that the written order is 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. In United States v. Samango, 607 F.2d 877, 880 (9th Cir. 1979), the 
Court held that the District Court's oral order was not the starting point 
for running of the statute of limitations where the Court stated its 
intent 
to issue a written order at a later date. The Court of Appeals reasoned 
that if a District Court contemplates issuing a formal judgment, then the 
time for appeal does not begin to run until that formal judgment is 
entered. In this case, we are not concerned with the timeliness of a 
notice of appeal, but rather with the cut-off date for the District 
Court's 
power to enter orders, oral or written, regarding Manno's speech to the 
press. Because the District Court's December 6 oral order had judicial 
force and effect, and subjected Manno to the possibility of contempt for 
violation. It was appealable collaterally despite the Court's stated 
intention to put it in writing. 
 
7. See Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 58 ("Every judgment shall be set forth on a 
separate document. A judgment is effective only when so set forth . . . 
.") 
 
                                12 
  
on appeal, so the record includes the transcripts of the two 
hearings, and all of the ancillary filings in the District 
Court, including a copy of the December 4, 2000, Inquirer 
article. 
 
District Courts are allowed to supplement the record with 
a written opinion or amplification of a prior written or oral 
recorded ruling. See 3d Cir. LAR 3.1 (1988). Such a writing 
must be filed within 15 days of the District Court's receipt 
of the notice of appeal. See id. In this case, the notice of 
appeal was filed on December 8, 2000. The January 10 
hearing transcript and the March 12 written order do not 
meet the 15-day deadline of our rule. 
 
When considering litigation transcripts or memoranda 
filed by the District Court after the LAR 3.1 15-day window 
has expired, "we will look to the nature of the supplemental 
memorandum and whether its consideration would 
prejudice the defendant." United States v. Bennett, 161 F.3d 
171, 186 (3d Cir. 1998). LAR 3.1 "was designed to provide 
more flexibility . . . [it was] not intended to inhibit or 
discourage District Courts from preparing opinions as they 
presently do." Id. In Bennett, this court considered a 
Sentencing Memorandum entered by the District Court 
after briefing in the Court of Appeals was complete. 161 
F.3d 171, 186. We reasoned that the untimely Sentencing 
Memorandum was an amplification of the District Court's 
sentencing decisions, and would not prejudice the 
defendant. See id. In United States v. Pelullo, 14 F.3d 881, 
907 (3d Cir. 1994), we observed that "the preferred practice 
is for the district court to file any memorandum opinion 
before or concurrent with its final judgment. Exigent 
circumstances may justify a late memorandum, but delayed 
filing may raise suspicions of partiality." The Pelullo court 
re-emphasized that LAR 3.1 is not an iron-clad rule, and 
inferred that courts would evaluate whether to consider a 
District Court's post-appeal submission on a case-by-case 
basis. 
 
In this case, the District Court uttered its last word in 
March 2000. Although this occurred after Manno had filed 
his brief on appeal, it occurred two months before Manno 
filed his reply brief. Manno was free to address the District 
Court's January transcript and March written order in his 
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reply brief; in fact, he did. Manno sustained no prejudice. 
We consider the District Court's January transcript and 
March written order as supplementing its reasons for 
entering the December 6, 2000, gag order, as well as 
defining the exact parameters of the gag order. 8 We do not 
consider the District Court's post-December 8, 2000, 
actions concerning the gag order as an additional exercise 
of jurisdiction over the gag order. 
 
D. 
 
Our jurisdiction is limited constitutionally to live cases 
and controversies. See U.S. Const. art. III,S 2. The District 
Court's order expires after the Court decides the pre-trial 
motions; at that point, the issue on appeal will be moot. 
 
We retain jurisdiction because this case involves an issue 
"capable of repetition, yet evading review." See United 
States v. Antar, 38 F.3d 1348, 1356 (3d Cir. 1994) (citing 
Southern Pacific Term. Co. v. Interstate Comm. Comm'n, 219 
U.S. 498, 515 (1911)). The capable of repetition-evading 
review doctrine has two requirements: 1) the challenged 
action must have been too short in duration to be fully 
litigated prior to its cessation or expiration; and 2) there 
must have been a reasonable likelihood that the same 
complaining party would be subjected to the same action 
again. See id. (citing Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 
149 (1975)). 
 
A gag order lasting until a pre-trial motion pertaining to 
the offensive subject is filed and decided, is too short in 
duration to be litigated prior to its expiration. In this case, 
the gag order is collateral to the merits of the criminal 
action, so there is no reason for the criminal action to wait 
for a decision on this appeal. By the time Manno could 
obtain an appellate decision on the merits, the gag order in 
all probability would have expired. Without review in this 
case's current posture, there is a virtual certainty that a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. This outcome is the same as if we had held that Manno's notice of 
appeal was filed prematurely under Fed. R. App. Proc. 4(a)(2). Either 
way, the record would include both hearing transcripts and the March 
12, 2001, written order, as well as a copy of the Inquirer article. 
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party like Manno would be subjected to the same 
unreviewable action in the future. Accordingly, we retain 
jurisdiction to decide the appeal on its merits. 
 
III. 
 
The rights protected by the First Amendment to the 
United States Constitution frequently are in tension with 
other constitutional rights. The task of resolving that 
tension without unduly burdening a competing right has 
unceasingly occupied all levels of the federal courts. We 
return to this familiar but no less difficult setting. 
 
A. 
 
"It is a prized American privilege to speak one's mind, 
although not always with perfect good taste, on all public 
institutions." New York Times Co. v. Sullivan , 376 U.S. 254, 
269 (1963) (citing Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 270 
(1941). At the same time, "a trial judge has an affirmative 
constitutional duty to minimize the effects of prejudicial 
pretrial publicity." Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 
368, 378 (1978). In Pennekamp v. Florida, Justice 
Frankfurter discussed the tension we find in this appeal: 
 
       Formulas embodying vague and uncritical 
       generalizations offer tempting opportunities to evade 
       the need for continuous thought. But so long as men 
       want freedom they resist this temptation. Such 
       formulas are most beguiling and most mischievous 
       when contending claims are those not of right and 
       wrong but of two rights, each highly important to the 
       well-being of society. 
 
328 U.S. 331, 351 (1945) (Frankfurter, J. concurring). The 
Supreme Court "has held that the Constitution[does] not 
allow absolute freedom of expression -- a freedom 
unrestricted by the duty to respect others needs fulfillment 
of which makes for the dignity and security of man." Id. 
(citing Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1918). Justice 
Holmes's famous "clear and present danger" test is the 
penultimate embodiment in First Amendment law of the 
principle that freedom of speech is critically important, but 
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that "its exercise must be compatible with the preservation 
of other freedoms essential to a democracy and guaranteed 
by our Constitution." Pennekamp, 328 U.S. at 353 
(Frankfurter, J. concurring). 
 
To have full force and effect, the First Amendment may 
not be trimmed just because of appealing circumstances; 
the regulation of speech-connected activities must be 
carefully restricted. See Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Dist., 393 
U.S. 503, 513 (1968). "The privilege of `free speech', like 
other privileges, is not absolute; it has its seasons; a 
democratic society has an acute interest in its protection 
and cannot indeed live without it; but it is an interest 
measured by its purpose." NLRB v. Federbush Co., 121 F.2d 
954, 957 (2d Cir. 1941) (Hand, J.). 
 
In many cases, the Supreme Court has provided 
guidance on balancing competing rights in the First 
Amendment context. Specifically, in Gentile v. State Bar of 
Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030 (1990), the Court examined the 
competing interests between lawyers in a pending case 
wishing to speak to the media about that case, and a 
district court attempting fairly to adjudicate that action. In 
this case, we face a similar tension between a disqualified 
attorney's right to speak to the media about a pending case, 
and a trial court's constitutional duty to try a case fairly 
without the negative impact of unfavorable pretrial 
publicity. 
 
B. 
 
We exercise plenary review over the legal standards 
applied in the District Court. See United States v. Antar, 38 
F.3d 1348, 1356-57 (3d Cir. 1994). In the First Amendment 
context, reviewing courts have a duty to engage in a 
searching, independent factual review of the full record. See 
Antar, 38 F.3d at 1357 (citing New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285 (1964)); Fabulous Assoc., Inc. v. 
Pennsylvania Public Utility Com'n, 896 F.2d 780, 784 (3d 
Cir. 1990) (noting the exacting standard of review 
traditionally applied to state actions impacting on rights 
protected by the First Amendment). The Supreme Court has 
emphasized an appellate court's obligation independently to 
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examine the whole record to ensure "that the judgment 
does not constitute a forbidden intrusion on the field of free 
expression." Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 
466 U.S. 485, 499 (1984) (citing New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 284- 286 (1964); NAACP v. 
Claiborne Hardware, Co., 458 U.S. 886, 933-934 (1982); 
Greenbelt Cooperative Pub. Assn. v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 11 
(1970); St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 732- 733 
(1968)). 
 
No cases are cited to us in this circuit or in the Supreme 
Court discussing the precise issue on appeal, and our own 
research has not uncovered any. Some cases concern gag 
orders on lawyers representing defendants, others discuss 
gag orders on defendants themselves, and others concern 
restrictions on the press. However, we know of no case 
which deals with the constitutionality of an order gagging a 
criminal defendant's former attorney. Manno argues that 
following his disqualification, he was no longer an attorney 
in the case; instead, he was a member of the public at 
large, free to make statements to the press. The 
Government responds that Manno was still a lawyer obliged 
under legal canons to avoid making Scarfo's case in the 
press. 
 
The District Court stated it had inherent power to control 
the proceedings before it by precluding a disqualified 
attorney from making comments to the press on an 
important issue before a court had adjudicated it. Among 
the reasons the Court put forth in support of the gag order 
were: 1) to maintain decorum; 2) to maintain fairness; 3) to 
avoid prejudicing the Court before it made decisions; and 4) 
to allow for the orderly, "nice," and civil flow of proceedings. 
The Court at one point stated that it was not concerned 
about tainting the potential jury pool, but later invoked the 
risk of jury pool tampering in support of the order. 
 
A gag order like the one issued against Manno is a 
restraint on speech that raises rights under the First 
Amendment of the United States Constitution. The 
Supreme Court and Courts of Appeal have announced 
varying standards to review gag orders depending on who 
or what is being gagged. The press, the public, criminal 
defendants, and attorneys have received separate analytical 
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treatment by the Supreme Court concerning restrictions on 
speech. See, e.g., Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 
20 (1984) ("[O]n several occasions this Court has approved 
restriction on the communications of trial participants 
where necessary to ensure a fair trial for a criminal 
defendant."); Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale , 443 U.S. 368 
(1979) (under certain circumstances, neither the public nor 
the press has an independent constitutional right to insist 
on access to a pretrial suppression hearing); Branzburg v. 
Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (concerning a reporter's 
claimed privilege from being compelled to disclose names of 
confidential sources); United States v. Brown , 218 F.3d 415 
(5th Cir. 2000) (appeal by defendant politician contesting 
validity of gag order); United States v. Ford , 830 F.2d 596, 
598 (6th Cir. 1987) (same). 
 
As a rule, "the speech of lawyers representing clients in 
pending cases may be regulated under a less demanding 
standard than that established for regulation of the press." 
Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030, 1074 (1990). 
In Gentile, the Court addressed a lawyer's appeal from a 
Nevada Bar Disciplinary Board's finding that he violated a 
rule prohibiting lawyers from making extrajudicial 
statements to the press when they knew or reasonably 
should have known the statements would have a 
substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an 
adjudicative proceeding. Gentile had held a press 
conference the day after his client was indicted on criminal 
charges. The Supreme Court framed the issue as "whether 
a lawyer who represents a defendant involved with the 
criminal justice system may insist on the same standard 
[as applied to a prior restraint on the press-- clear and 
present danger,] before he is disciplined for public 
pronouncements about the case, or whether the state may 
penalize that sort of speech upon a lesser showing." Gentile, 
501 U.S. at 1071. 
 
The Gentile Court dealt with a slightly different situation 
than we have before us. It punished an attorney under a 
state rule for having made comments to the press about his 
client's innocence in a pending case. In our case, The Court 
prohibited Manno, a disqualified attorney, from making any 
future statements to the press. Gentile expressed "no 
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opinion on the constitutionality of a rule regulating the 
statements of a lawyer who is not participating in the 
pending case about which the statements are made." 
Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1072 n. 5. However, the Court 
discussed thoroughly the standards used in restricting the 
speech of attorneys in general, and as discussed below, 
that is the appropriate standard in this case. That Manno 
no longer represented Scarfo when the District Court 
enjoined him is a slight deviation from Gentile , and does 
not distract from our application of the Supreme Court's 
reasoning. 
 
A lawyer's right to free speech in a pending case may be 
circumscribed in the courtroom and is limited outside the 
courtroom as well. See Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1073. A lawyer 
admitted to the bar of a court must expect the disciplinary 
limitations of his profession. Lawyers should not be 
surprised when they learn that their chosen professional 
status, as in the cases of judges, restricts their conduct and 
speech at times. 
 
Gentile held that the "substantial likelihood of material 
prejudice" standard is constitutionally permissible to 
balance the attorney's interest in free speech against the 
state's interest in fair judicial determinations. Extrajudicial 
statements by attorneys pose a threat to a pending 
proceeding's fairness because attorneys have access to 
information through discovery and client communication, 
and because their statements are likely to be received as 
especially authoritative. The "substantial likelihood of 
material prejudice" standard fairly balances the integrity of 
the justice system with attorneys' constitutional rights. 
Under Gentile, we examine the record to determine whether 
the District Court's injunction in this case prevented a 
substantial likelihood of material prejudice to the judicial 
proceeding.9 Any limitation on the attorney's speech must 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. In United States v. Brown, 218 F.3d 415 (5th Cir. 2000), the Court 
applied Gentile to a District Court order prohibiting attorneys, parties, 
and witnesses from discussing an ongoing criminal action with any 
public communications media. Importantly, the Court of Appeals agreed 
with the District Court's finding that the possible impact of 
extrajudicial 
statements included the creation of a "carnival atmosphere," and tainting 
of the un-sequestered jury. This finding, supported by the record, was 
pivotal in establishing the substantial likelihood of prejudice required 
by 
Gentile for a gag order to stand. These are the types of findings absent 
in this case. 
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be narrow and necessary, carefully aimed at comments 
likely to influence the trial or judicial determination. See 
Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1075. 
 
Under the facts of this case, we also decide whether a 
slightly more compelling reason is required for a District 
Court to quash the speech of an attorney who no longer 
represents the criminal defendant in the underlying action. 
Manno portrays himself as an everyday citizen following his 
disqualification, but that is plainly not so. The District 
Court perceptively found that Manno was longtime counsel 
to Scarfo and was known by many, including the media, as 
having close ties with Scarfo. Manno was the beneficiary of 
extensive client communication, and his statements were 
received by the press as especially authoritative. The press 
presumably sought out Manno, even though he was 
disqualified, because they presumed that he had 
information of the sort that only a retained lawyer would 
know. See Supp. Appx. 39 ("Manno: The Philadelphia 
Inquirer came to me, they asked me questions.") 
 
Manno was, for all intents and purposes, in the same 
position as the attorney referred to in the Gentile case -- an 
insider privy to facts, and a public status removing him 
from the leagues of common observers or uninvolved 
attorneys. He was not merely a lawyer with a passing 
interest in the case. Even following his disqualification, 
Manno's ties to Scarfo were much more significant than 
that of a common court observer and member of the public. 
Gentile pertains to gag orders on trial participants; Manno, 
no longer a trial participant, still retained the raiment and 
appearance of one and, therefore, was in a position to still 
materially prejudice the pending proceedings before the 
Court. Therefore, it is reasonable to apply the"substantial 
likelihood of material prejudice" standard announced in 
Gentile to this case. Cf. United States v. Brown, 218 F.3d 
415, 426 (5th Cir. 2000) (describing the Gentile  opinion as 
approving Nevada's substantial likelihood standard to 
"attorneys," and not differentiating between a current 
attorney for a party or the former attorney of a party). 
 
The "evils" against which a gag order may appropriately 
apply are those generally associated with risk of prejudice 
to the jury pool. See Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1075. The 
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Supreme Court is also concerned with any other form of 
prejudice to the actual outcome of a trial. See id. Preventing 
a "carnival atmosphere" in a high profile case is also a 
legitimate reason to gag an attorney. See Brown , 218 F.3d 
at 429; see also Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966). 
 
The Government strenuously defends a New Jersey local 
rule prohibiting extrajudicial comments, and a New Jersey 
ethical rule doing the same. The District Court relied on 
both as a basis for its order.10 However, the District Court's 
injunction must stand or fall on its own terms in the 
factual setting described in the record. We do not perceive 
credible findings of any risk of material prejudice, much 
less a substantial likelihood of material prejudice. It is 
difficult to discern a reasonable source of prejudice in this 
case. There was little, if any, prejudice to the jury pool 
because Manno's comments, and the gag order itself, 
pertained only to an issue of admissibility of evidence -- a 
determination made by the judge, not a jury. The Court's 
decision on admissibility of the keystroke logging device 
evidence, even if reported in the press, would at most alert 
citizens to the existence of the case, but not to any facts 
pertaining to guilt or innocence as in Gentile . The District 
Court apparently agreed when on January 10, 2001, it 
stated, "I'm not talking about affecting the jury. . . . You 
folks are off in left field when you talk about[affecting the 
jury]. I was concerned whether we talk about how I felt -- 
orderly presentation of significant and important arguments 
by counsel . . ." 
 
The District Court's primary concern was the risk of 
prejudice to it in deciding the legal issues not yet before it. 
See Supp. Appx. 56 (3/12/01 order); Appx. 19 (12/5/00 
transcript). But there was no risk of prejudice to the Judge 
because judges are experts at placing aside their personal 
biases and prejudices, however obtained, before making 
reasoned decisions. Judges are experts at closing their eyes 
and ears to extraneous or irrelevant matters and focusing 
only on the relevant in the proceedings before them. The 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. These rules are not directly at issue in this appeal, and we express 
no opinion concerning them except as to the result of their application 
in this case. 
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District Court did not articulate any specific or general 
prejudice it would suffer, and we can see none. The closest 
the Court came to identifying prejudice was its statement 
that "I was concerned whether we talk about how I felt -- 
orderly presentation of significant and important arguments 
by counsel." The District Judge appears to have been upset 
about reading of a matter pertaining to a case before him 
in the newspaper before hearing about it in his courtroom. 
See Supp. Appx. 34 ("I was upset because, in my judgment, 
you were trying the motion in front of the press . .. .") His 
concern does not rise to any measurable level of prejudice. 
An perturbed judge is not necessarily a prejudiced judge 
especially when, as in this case, he is an experienced judge. 
 
A fair and impartial presentation of the case would not be 
disrupted or materially prejudiced by Manno's pretrial 
extrajudicial statement to the press. The statement may 
have been imbalanced or even irritating because of the 
timing and content, but not materially prejudicial. If the 
District Judge had some undisclosed reason for suffering 
prejudice from the newspaper article, his proper course of 
action was recusal, not a prior restraint on all of Manno's 
speech relating to this case. 
 
We always are mindful of the importance of an orderly 
and fair trial, especially one in which the liberty of an 
individual and important interests of the public are at 
stake. However, we are also concerned with the 
longstanding value and importance of the protection of First 
Amendment rights. Public awareness and criticism have 
great importance, especially where, as here, they concern 
alleged governmental investigatory abuse. See Gentile, 501 
U.S. at 1035. Without evidence that Manno's statements to 
the press jeopardized the fairness of the trial or in any way 
materially impaired or prejudiced the judicial power of the 
court, we can see no valid reason to interdict a lawyer's 
First Amendment right of speech, even of one disqualified 
in the case. 
 
IV. 
 
In summary, aside from informing the public about an 
important legal issue about to be raised before the court, 
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Manno's comments on an interesting legal issue did not 
pose a threat to the fairness of the trial or to the jury pool. 
Nor did the District Court identify a risk of a carnival-type 
atmosphere in the case, although organized crime cases 
often draw massive public interest. See, e.g. , United States 
v. Cutler, 58 F.3d 825 (2d Cir. 1995). There having been no 
identifiable prejudice or risk of prejudice, the gag order was 
erroneous. The order of the District Court will be reversed. 
Costs will be taxed against the appellee. 
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